Hybrids: on the crime-terror nexus by Ruggiero, Vincenzo
Middlesex University Research Repository
An open access repository of
Middlesex University research
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk
Ruggiero, Vincenzo (2019) Hybrids: on the crime-terror nexus. International Journal of
Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 43 (1). pp. 49-60. ISSN 0192-4036
Final accepted version (with author’s formatting)
This version is available at: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/23137/
Copyright:
Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically.
Copyright and moral rights to this work are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners
unless otherwise stated. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for commercial gain
is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-commercial, research or study
without prior permission and without charge.
Works, including theses and research projects, may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or
extensive quotations taken from them, or their content changed in any way, without first obtaining
permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). They may not be sold or exploited commercially in
any format or medium without the prior written permission of the copyright holder(s).
Full bibliographic details must be given when referring to, or quoting from full items including the
author’s name, the title of the work, publication details where relevant (place, publisher, date), pag-
ination, and for theses or dissertations the awarding institution, the degree type awarded, and the
date of the award.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact the
Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address:
eprints@mdx.ac.uk
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated.
See also repository copyright: re-use policy: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/policies.html#copy
 1 







Terrorist organizations may complement their military capability with functioning 
infrastructures and profitable activity in economic ventures as well as in crime. 
This leads many commentators to focus on the increasing overlap between 
terrorism and crime, including and particularly organized crime. The present 
paper is devoted to the analysis of this controversial overlap, and after providing a 
concise outline of definitions of organized crime and terrorism found in 
criminology, highlights similarities and differences between the two forms of 
criminality, along with the ambiguity of the very notion of ‘crime-terror nexus’.  
 





The crime-terror nexus transpires in embryonic forms in some contributions of 
classical criminology. Such contributions do not describe clear overlaps between 
terrorism and organized crime, but simply allude to the proximity of some forms 
of political violence with conventional criminality. Sedition, for Beccaria, 
combines political as well as criminal elements, and being socially devastating, 
constitutes the only offence against which capital punishment is justified. Similar 
opinion is expressed by Bentham in respect of the crimes against the state. The 
latter, moreover, criticizes the Declaration of Human Rights approved by the 
French government after the Revolution because it is the fruit of an insurrection, 
therefore of terrorist violence and crime. Positivist analysis hints at a crime-
terror nexus, when it detects in some forms of political violence the outcome of 
individual personalities that would be induced to violent criminality even 
without being inspired by a political idea. Functionalism, in its turn, links 
homicide with strong forms of binding with sets of moral values which may 
characterise political as well as criminal subcultures. Chicago sociologists, as we 
shall see, provide the most glaring example of how politics and organised crime 
groups can shape symbiotic alliances, while conflict theorists tend to argue that 
all forms of violent hostility originate from struggles between groups over 
material as well as political power. Symbolic interactionism, finally, is more 
interested in how institutional and anti-institutional violence affect each other. 
   These contributions will be examined in some detail in the following pages, 
with the purpose of ascertaining to what extent they constitute premonitions of 
contemporary events. Such events have led observers to posit the existence of an 
overlap between terrorism and crime, particularly organised crime, as many 
terrorist organizations complement their military capability with functioning 
infrastructures and profitable activity in economic ventures as well as in crime. 
The validity of the notion of hybrids, namely of an undeniable crime-terror 
nexus, is advocated by some and contested by others, and the pages below will 
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provide the main arguments and the most relevant empirical material offered by  
the two parties.  What will emerge is an analytical landscape indicating that the 
overlap between terrorism and organised crime is, at the very least, 
controversial and, at times, merely prompted by the strong disapproval or 
revulsion that both elicit. Similarities and differences between the two forms of 
criminality will be highlighted, as will the ambiguity of the very notion of ‘crime-
terror nexus’. In the last section of this paper such ambiguity will come to the 
fore with particular emphasis, when the relationships linking organised crime 
and terrorism respectively with the establishment will be focused upon. It may 
be helpful, however, to set off with a concise outline of definitions of organized 




The best-known definitions of organized crime found in the criminological 
tradition can be classified very succinctly as follows. Some hinge on strictly 
quantitative aspects: the number of individuals involved in a criminal group is 
said to determine the organizational degree of that group (Ferracuti, 1988; 
Johnson, 1962). Organized crime is also said to differ from conventional crime 
for the larger scale of its illegal activity (Moore, 1987). Other definitions focus 
mainly on a temporal variable, that is on the time-span during which illegal 
activities are conducted. The death or incarceration of a member of an organized 
crime group, therefore, does not stop the activities in which the group is 
involved.  
   Criminologists who focus attention on its structural characteristics observe 
that organized crime operates by means of flexible and diversified groups. Such a 
structure is faced with peculiar necessities due to its condition of illegality. 
Firstly, the necessity, while remaining a ‘secret’ organization, to exert publicly its 
coercive and dissuasive strength. An equilibrium is therefore required between 
publicity and secrecy that only a complex structure is able to acquire. Secondly, 
the necessity to neutralize law enforcement through omertà, corruption and 
retaliation. Finally, the need to reconcile its internal order, through specific 
forms of conflict control, with its external legitimacy, through the provision of 
occupational and social opportunities (Cohen, 1977). 
   Frequently, definitions of organized crime revolve around the concept of 
‘professionalism’: its members, it is suggested, acquire skills and career 
advancement by virtue of their full-time involvement in illegality. The concept of 
professionalism, however, clashes with that of normalization, through which 
some observers describe the increasing flexibility of criminal markets, the 
constructed nature of the notion of organized crime, and the involvement of 
diverse actors in a domain where professional criminals once prevailed (Hobbs, 
2013). Other authors prefer to concentrate on the collective clientele of 
organized crime. The latter is therefore identified with a structure involved in 
the public provision of goods and services which are officially deemed illegal. 
Organized crime groups, in this view, simply fill the inadequacy of institutional 
agencies, which are unable to provide those goods and services, or perhaps 
officially deny that demand exists for them. The contribution of McIntosh (1975) 
is to be located in this perspective. She notes that organized crime is informed by 
a particular relationship between offenders and victims. For example, even the 
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victims of extortion rackets often fail to report the offenders, less because they 
are terrified than ‘because they see the extortionist as having more power in 
their parish than the agents of the state’ (ibid: 50). It may be added that the 
victims may also recognize their ‘protector’ as an authority more able than its 
official counterpart to distribute resources and opportunities. Among the goods 
provided, trust and protection are singled out as paramount. These, which 
should be supplied by the state, may under certain circumstances become the 
preserve of private entrepreneurs, namely organized crime. Therefore, this type 
of crime is purported to be an industry for the supply of private protection and 
the distribution of trust to economic actors who would otherwise be unable to 
interact safely (Gambetta, 1992). In the case of the mafia, for example, its 
strength as an industry for the supply of protection and trust is deemed a 
consequence of traditional popular distrust of the official agencies, and of foreign 
domination before them. This line of analysis is partly endorsed by Varese 
(2010), who proposes to consider the organised crime phenomenon as part of 
the broader category of governance. His suggestion is that a crucial distinction 
should be drawn between producers of goods and services, and suppliers of 
forms of regulation, protection and governance. The form of governance alluded 
to here is one that usurps the functions of the state in societies where sovereign 
rule is inadequate, a form of governance from below which extends power 
beyond the state and into the realms of civil society (Edwards and Levi, 2008; 
Ruggiero, 2012; Sergi, 2017). 
    Moving on to violent conflict, this has been an object of study in criminology 
since the very inception of the discipline. Before the word ‘terrorism’ gained 
common use, early criminologists dealt with both institutional and anti-
institutional violence. Classical criminology, particularly the work of Cesare 
Beccaria (1965) and Jeremy Bentham (1967), regarded political violence as a 
breach of the social contract binding citizens and authority together. The focus of 
Beccaria, for instance, was on ‘state savagery’ and, at the same time, on ‘crimes of 
sedition’. He linked institutional violence (torture, capital punishment, 
assassinations and other forms of state violence) with violent outbursts directed 
against the state. From a contemporary perspective, we can summarize his 
thought as follows: excessive state violence provokes violent responses by non-
state agents.  
   Positivist criminologists studied regicides, romantic murderers and violent 
anarchists and looked at the social and psychological causes of political violence. 
While in general they thought that violent action against the system retained an 
‘evolutive’ character, in the sense that it accelerated social change, when faced 
with specific forms of terrorist acts they judged those acts as emanating from 
monomaniac individuals who would be violent even if not inspired by political 
beliefs. Their distinction between rebellion and revolution was, in this respect, 
crucial. The former, in their view, was conduct caused by insanity, moral 
madness, narcissistic martyrdom or suicidal drive. The latter was an 
evolutionary process which, without necessarily resorting to violence, aimed at 
social change and improved social justice. It is noteworthy that this school of 
thought formulated a notion of ‘suicide missions’ well before these became 
common currency in the present times, as they described anarchists who 
assassinated aristocrats in the middle of the streets as individuals whose 
principal aim was an ‘honourable death’ or ‘indirect suicide’ (Lombroso, 1894).  
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   Within the functionalist tradition, Durkheim’s seminal study of suicide and 
homicide offers tools and arguments that can be extended to the analysis of 
political violence and terrorism. Durkheim associates the rise of homicide with 
the growth of those collective sentiments whose interest obsessively resides in 
the group, the family, or the state. The feelings that lie at the base of the cult of 
such entities may be in themselves conducive to murder. When the family, the 
group, the state, or for that matter a political idea or a religious belief, appear to 
be the supreme good, their importance transcends the sympathy and 
compassion due to the individual or people in general. Like some forms of 
suicide, terrorism and political violence in general may be the result of excessive 
integration in a creed, an identity, or of a strong form of binding to a set of moral 
values (Durkheim, 1996).  
   Looking at the contributions of the Chicago School of sociology in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, we find a penetrating analysis that echoes 
aspects of the contemporary debate. The study of migrants’ communities and 
excluded groups brought to light the connections between organized crime and 
political violence. Criminal organizations, while conducting their illicit business, 
acted as the violent arm of political parties, using terroristic forms of 
intimidation, particularly during electoral campaigns (Landesco, 1969). Rival 
candidates were attacked or kidnapped, in a climate that turned political 
competition into violent interpersonal conflict. Subsequent criminological 
analysis focuses, rather, on collective conflicts, describing societies as composed 
of competing groups and contrasting value systems. Political violence, from a 
conflict theory perspective, is interpreted as the outcome of struggles for the 
attainment of material and ideological power.  
   Finally, symbolic interactionism can be useful for the causative explanation of 
terrorism. This school of thought examines the relational dynamics that produce 
harmony or conflict, in other words, how interacting individuals and groups 
determine their mutual conduct. In this view, state and non-state entities engage 
in acts of terror when both feel that they have no space left for peaceful 
interaction.  
    
From enterprise to network 
 
It is worth supplementing the overview presented so far with some additional 
observations. 
   Some organized crime groups do not limit their activities to conventional 
offending. Successful organized crime, for example, manages to establish 
partnerships with the official world, particularly with business enclaves and 
political representatives. When unable to do so, criminal groups remain pariah 
organizations operating in the underworld, and are destined to exhaust their 
resources and energies within the restricted realm of illicit markets.  
Organizations leaping onto the ‘overworld’, by contrast, are required to adopt a 
business style, a conduct, a strategy and a ‘vocabulary of meaning’ helping them 
to blend in the environment receiving them. They may still ‘commute’ between 
legality and illegality, but their new status will force them to identify allies, 
sponsors, mentors and protectors. In brief, they will be required to develop the 
negotiation skills characterizing an economic consortium or a political party.  
 5 
   It is at this point that organizations develop the features of networks, and this 
process may be followed by conventional criminal groups as well as by terrorist 
groups. The difference, however, is that organized crime networks imply the 
alliance between highly heterogeneous groups and individuals, each with a 
distinctive cultural and ethnic background, who may establish common goals on 
an occasional or long-term basis. Actors operating in conventional criminal 
networks are socially ‘fuzzy’, in the sense that their exploits and careers overlap 
with those of others who are apparently radically different from them. Such 
networks shape grey areas where licit, semi-licit and overtly illicit economies 
overlap (Ruggiero, 2017). Terrorist networks, by contrast, require a substantial 
degree of homogeneity among participants, who may ‘offer’ what they can, from 
donations to logistical support. Of course, participants may also offer ‘action’ and 
their own life, when they engage in missions inspired by the terrorist group with 
which they ideologically identify. However, while conventional criminal 
networks imply a form of collective behaviour, terrorist networks show signs of 
collective identity. The latter, inevitably, brings to the fore a concept of social 
movement, of contentious politics, an idea of social change inscribed in a specific 
teleology or imagined finalism. Later, when more directly addressing hybrids, 
this aspect will receive some of the attention it deserves. 
   It seems that only after the events of 9/11 has criminology resumed any 
specific interest in political violence, at least in its variant commonly termed 
terrorism (random violence against civilians) (Freilich and LaFree, 2015). For 
example, there are scholars who advocate the application of criminological 
theories of ‘common’ violence to the analysis of political violence, arguing that 
both types of violence are directed to the achievement of goals. Both aim at 
extracting something from someone; moreover, at least by perpetrators, both are 
presented as the outcome of provocation by the victims (Ruggiero, 2006). From a 
different perspective, the suggestion has been made that the principles of 
situational crime prevention should also be applied to terrorism. According to 
this view, after identifying and removing the opportunities that violent groups 
exploit to mount their attacks, situational measures implemented through 
partnerships among a wide range of public and private agencies will assist with 
this task. In other contributions the point is put forward that conventional crime 
is characterized by tensions and dynamics that also underpin many forms of 
terrorism. Issues of shame, esteem, loss, and repressed anger, alongside the 
pursuit of pride and self or collective respect, which provide important tools to 
criminological analysis, may also help establish a taxonomy of terrorism.  
    Looking at the formation of terrorist networks, the point has been made that  
the invasion of a country may be followed by organized violent resistance, and 
that invasions may destabilize regimes and trigger sectarian attacks. It is 
estimated, incidentally, that over thirty per cent of the founders of ISIS are 
former members of the secret services of Iraq, who enact a form of revenge, 
responding to the invasion of their country with indiscriminate attacks (Gerges, 
2015; Lynch, 2015).  This imitative dynamic echoes aspects of symbolic 
interactionism mentioned above. In a similar vein, scholars have focused on 
criminalization, labeling processes and phobias which enhance rather than 
decelerate the radicalization of those who find themselves on the receiving end 
(Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Ahmed, 2015; Abbas and Awan, 2015; Khan, 2016).            
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    An enduring distinction, however, connotes the criminological field. Organized 
crime appears to be motivated by the accumulation of wealth:  
 
‘Though the evasion or neutering of state control and the corruption of 
officials may assist in the criminal enterprise, the generation of profit and 
the control of illicit markets is the primary focus of organized crime 
rather than any grasping of power for political ends’ (Campbell, 2014: 
230) . 
 
Terrorism, on the other hand, remains characterized as violence motivated by 
political, ideological, or philosophical considerations, aimed at civilians to 
‘generate fear and cause damage, and to coerce a government to act in a 
particular manner’ (ibid).  
   The following two sections gather, respectively, views positing a strong crime-
terror nexus and views highlighting some tentative components of such nexus.  
 
Hybrids and overarching etiologies  
 
A notion of hybrid, combining conventional with political criminality, emerges in 
some etiologies focused on excluded and marginalized groups. For example, the 
processes leading to involvement in organized crime groups or/and in terrorist 
networks, from some analytical perspectives, appear to be very similar. Such 
processes are said to stem from severe forms of inequality or from the 
resentment and humiliation suffered by the young components of minority 
groups. While older settlers chose where to live and partly maintained the 
culture of their country of origin, the young distanced themselves from that 
culture without acquiring a new one: ‘the danger that ruins life in the poor 
districts is not Islam or multiculturalism… it is deculturation’ (Todorov, 2014: 
168). ‘Deculturation’ is one of the characteristics of failed democracies, which are 
based on a winner-take-all logic whereby the losers are left with no place to 
occupy. Becoming involved in crime or in political extremism, in this situation, 
amounts to ‘pure and simple regression that offers a mixture of sacrificial and 
criminal heroism’ (Badiou, 2016: 56). Failed democracies, while wreaking 
destruction, encourage revenge, which is formalized through the mythology of 
tradition or the cult of the swaggering outlaw.  
   Overarching etiologies based on relative deprivation, however, neglect the 
substantial differences between terrorism and organized crime. Organized crime 
groups may use violence as a supplementary tool of negotiating their presence 
on markets, or with the system. Violent political groups, on the contrary, use 
violence as a signal of their unwillingness to negotiate with a system they would 
rather demolish. Their action transcends the immediate result they achieve, and 
prefigures, realistically or not, a different set of achievements which will be 
valued in a future, rather than in the current society.  
   Another overarching theory revolves around the techniques of neutralization 
identified in criminology research, and may well describe the ideological process 
whereby organized crime groups as well as violent political groups come to 
terms with the effects of their acts. The denial of the victim is operated through 
the perception of the victim as wrongdoer, the condemnation of the condemners 
through their association with immorality, and finally the appeal to higher 
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loyalties through the appropriation of the ideals and practices of one’s 
subculture, one’s political or religious creed. Techniques of neutralization, 
however, seem to belong to an ex post repertoire of motivations mobilized by 
offenders in order to fill the moral void they presumably experience. They are, in 
sum, a defensive device that may temper moral disorientation. In this sense, 
terrorism and conventional or organized crime display very similar 
characteristics, although such similarity may be insufficient to give rise to 
hybrids of the two.  
    Violent political groups, however, may pursue material gain as a means to 
reproduce and enhance their military apparatus and to acquire growing 
symbolic status, namely a capacity to step up their propaganda and hence their 
visibility. Along with offences aimed at the material reproduction of their 
organization, contemporary terrorists, who appear to ignore the ethical 
boundaries often respected by their counterparts of the 1970s and 1980s, are 
said to engage in crimes that their predecessors would find revolting: espionage, 
drug smuggling, gun running, money laundering, cell phone and credit card theft, 
immigration violations, extortion and prostitution (Hamm, 2007). Moreover, 
some contemporary perpetrators of terrorist acts are drawn from the offender 
population, although they do not consider themselves common criminals. 
Instead, they often see themselves as freedom fighters whose unlawful acts are 
motivated by a just cause and not by personal gain (Hoffman, 2006).  
   With the purpose of reproducing themselves, terrorist groups may acquire 
expertise in conventional criminality and through this pursue a form of ‘empire-
building’ that transcends their original political goal. Violent political groups who 
cease their operations, moreover, may find at their disposal not only unlawful 
expertise and skills, but also arms and infrastructures, and after the dismissal of 
their organization may use what they possess to start a career in criminal 
markets. Looking at ‘terrorism as crime’ from a particular angle, organized forms 
of criminality have been described as ‘lifeblood of terrorist groups’, and include 
all forms of acquisitive offences that mafia-type organizations would perpetrate 
(Hamm, 2007).  
    The growing dimension of transnational crime activities is regarded as a 
contributing factor to the blurring of the two phenomena, expressed through the 
development of alliances, the sharing of methods, and ultimately the merging of 
groups (Makarenko, 2004). Some authors see the evidence in the European 
Union of linkages between crime and terror as immense, ‘although the scholarly 
literature has shied away from these associations’ (Makarenko and Mesquita, 
2014: 259). Specific elements characterizing the crime-terror nexus are detected 
when criminals and terrorists engage in similar activity, or ‘relate symbiotically, 
as when they exchange drugs for weapons’ (Grabosky and Stohl, 2010). The two 
appear to have developed networked organizational forms and technological 
skills that enhance their capacity and resilience. The interface between 
organized crime groups and terrorism, as suggested by Grabosky and Stohl, 
reflects the need of the latter to support themselves and their operations, but 
also the politicization of ordinary criminals who eventually join terrorist groups. 
The reverse process is also possible, with individuals turning from fighters into 
criminals after the continuing exchange between the two parties of information, 
knowledge and assets for mutual benefit. Involvement in cigarette smuggling and 
counterfeiting by terrorist groups has been revealed (Shelley and Melzer, 2011; 
 8 
Capparico, Irrera and Tupman, 2014), while hybrids have been detected in the 
Islamic Maghreb, where crime groups and terrorists respond to specific material 
and political demands from local populations (Rosato, 2016). Terrorist groups 
are also attributed the power to control large enterprises, such as the gas fields 
in Eastern Algeria, close to the Libyan border. The case prompts the conclusion 
that the ‘interaction of crime, corruption, and terrorism is having a tremendous 
impact on both security and the global economy’ (Shelley, 2014: 1). Among the 
victims of such hybrids, or entangled criminal entities, the following are listed: 
‘economic growth, employment, security, development, and the sustainability of 
the planet’ (ibid: 4-5).  
   Analysts do emphasize that criminals are motivated by a broad spectrum of 
reasons, like personal enrichment, passion or revenge, while terrorists are led by 
what they believe is a higher cause (Foster, 2012). And yet, the separation of the 
two groups is sometimes deemed difficult. Of course, the presence of former 
criminals in terrorist groups is not unprecedented. But the phenomenon is now 
described as more pronounced and more visible. Research conducted by the 
ICSR (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence) 
suggests that in many European countries, the majority of jihadist foreign 
fighters are former offenders. The findings of this study, however, do not confirm 
the merging of criminals and terrorists as organizations, but of their social 
networks and environments. 
 
‘Criminal and terrorist groups have come to recruit from the same pool of 
people, creating (often unintended) synergies and overlaps that have 
consequences for how individuals radicalize and operate. This is what we 
call the new crime-terror nexus’ (ICSR, 2016: 3). 
 
   Whether new or old, the nexus is particularly emphasized by law enforcement 
agencies, which include within their remit the support of member states in 
preventing and combating all forms of serious international crime through the 
exchange of criminal intelligence. Perhaps the concern and focus on ‘serious 
international crime’, inevitably, leads agencies to adopt a joint approach to the 
two. The British National Crime Agency (NCA) follows the same route, providing 
a general definition that embraces a considerable range of groups and activities, 
some of which could be labeled organized crime groups while some others 
terrorist organizations. It is from the perspective of legal prosecution and law 
enforcement that the borders between terrorism and conventional and/or 
organized crime continue to be regarded as particularly blurred.  
   Other empirical studies do show that terrorist organizations may, when 
convenient, procure the services of criminal groups to further their political 
goals (Gallagher, 2016; Picarelli, 2006; Roth and Sever, 2006). In the recent past, 
among the hybrid organizations simultaneously pursuing material and political 
gain Colombian narco-terrorism appeared to be outstanding: ‘The number of 
assassinations and bombings generated by the cartels was very substantial… [so 
that] a categorical exclusion of the criminal motivation from a definition of 
terrorism does not seem to be warranted’ (Schmid, 2011: 66). Yet another case-
study of narco-terrorism in Colombia by Bibes (2001) indicates that, over the 
past thirty years, leftist guerilla groups and right-wing paramilitaries have 
largely depended on drug cartels to help finance their political objectives. Bibes 
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also describes instances where cartel leaders have in turn hired terrorist groups 
to carry out violent acts to achieve their own goals. Similarly, a study of Mali’s Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) proves that this terrorist organization, 
while principally aiming at disposing of the Mali government and establishing a 
caliphate, does act in conjunction with narco-traffickers (Boeke, 2016). 
Suggestions are also made that formerly politically motivated terrorist groups 
can develop conventional economically motivated organized crime syndicates 
(Hausken and Gupta, 2016). This development, however, is said to take place 
when terrorist organizations cease to be funded by benefactors and donors. 
Thus, following an end of hostilities with the state, members of the Colombian 
FARC and the provisional IRA, it is assumed, have turned into purely profit-
seeking organizations, relying on their terrorist skills to accumulate wealth 
(Byrne, 2009).  
   Ultimately, the crime-terror nexus is found in the shared skills that terrorists 
and criminals may have developed in outmaneuvering law enforcement and the 
techniques acquired in committing property offences. 
‘Jihadists not only condone the use of “ordinary” criminality to raise 
funds, they have argued that doing so is the ideologically correct way of 
waging jihad. Combined with large numbers of former criminals in their 
ranks, this will make financing attacks through crime not only possible 
and legitimate but, increasingly, their first choice’ (ICSR, 2016: 4). 
 It is time to bring more controversial aspects of the debate to the fore. 
    
The ambiguity of joint analyses 
 
While the word ‘terrorism’ is not even mentioned in the detailed index of a 
recent important handbook on organized crime (Paoli, 2014), the phrase 
‘organized crime’ recurs in many contemporary contributions on political 
violence and terrorism. This may be because both forms of crime are analyzed 
against the variables offered by the sociology of organizations, which offers 
useful conceptualizations for the understanding of collective behaviour in 
delimited structures. Terrorism and organized crime, in this respect, may be 
similar because both deploy an organizational layout. An objection, in this 
respect, could be that any group of people acting in concert can be viewed as a 
social organization, therefore, it is not only organized crime and terrorism that 
lend themselves to a joint analysis, but also any couple of aggregations of 
individuals who perform collective action. As a way of overcoming this 
ambiguity, the following explanation referring to organized crime groups as 
opposed to terrorism has been offered: ‘Their primary motivation is usually 
financial gain’ (Holmes, 2016). However, if the focus is on illegal structures 
rather than illegal activities, the concern is how organizations relate to states.  
   Attempts to influence state officials are commonly made by organized 
criminals, who mainly pursue impunity for their offences and, when engaged in 
the official economy, seek contracts to carry out some form of state-funded 
public work (Abadinsky, 2013) The goal is, in such cases, of an economic rather 
than a political nature. ‘Commonly, the lack of political goals is seen as a defining 
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characteristic of organized crime that distinguishes it from ideologically and 
religiously motivated terrorist and insurgent groups’ (von Lampe, 2016: 263).  
   The controversy around motivation accompanies the debate on hybrids, with 
some authors underlining the divine or political command obeyed by terrorists 
as opposed to greed commanding organized crime groups. In an attempt to 
identify differences and similarities, the suggestion has been made that the 
association of terrorism with organized crime mitigates the hideous and noxious 
operations of the former and that, comparatively, the latter rank higher. Among 
the similarities, characteristics such as secrecy, ruthlessness, intimidation and 
the use of front organizations are mentioned. Among the differences, 
motivations, the nature of the relationship with governments and the media and 
the type of victimization are enumerated (Schmid, 1996, 2011).  
    There is, in sum, disagreement around the nexus between organized crime and 
terrorism, its nature and scope, with some commentators arguing that such 
nexus amounts to nothing more than temporary marriages of convenience. 
While generalizable statements are unhelpful, distinctions are identified that 
might clarify the issue. The proliferation of hybrids, it is felt, may be likely in 
certain contexts more than in others, for instance in areas experiencing armed 
conflicts. On the other hand, lack of trust between the two types of membership 
may hamper collaboration, which entails added risk to groups inured to avoiding 
risk. For this reason, new types of organizations, distinct from both organized 
crime groups and terrorist groups, may be springing which service both 
criminals and terrorists with illicit services. These new groups may well be 
sponsored by legitimate states. In other words, the explanatory power of the 
crime-terror nexus is questioned, as it is considered to be based on insufficient 
evidence (Carrapico, Irrera and Tupman, 2014). Rather than focusing on the 
linkages between organized crime and terrorist groups, which are regarded as 
sporadic and short-lived, some propose to reorient attention on the links 
between criminal organizations and the state. ‘A research agenda that prioritizes 
the local dynamics of interactions between criminal networks, militant 
ideologies, society and the state is likely to produce more nuanced analyses than 
an over-reliance on these binary approaches’ (Lewis, 2014: 337). A further 
distinction pertains to sovereign-bound groups as opposed to sovereign-free 
groups, the former ‘defined by their goal of establishing a new and separate 
state’ (Picarelli, 2006: 13), and the latter ‘concerned with profits and authority in 
illicit markets rather than sovereignty and authority over neighbourhoods and 
regions’ (ibid: 15). 
   Working closely with Islamic fundamentalists, Sageman (2017) gained an 
intimate understanding of the development and shape of their networks. 
Focusing on the global Salafi jihad, he refutes the explanation that factors such as 
poverty, trauma, madness or ignorance drive people to terrorism. He highlights, 
instead, the crucial role of social networks in the transformation of socially 
isolated individuals into warriors. Biographical data on some two hundred 
participants in jihad reveal that, for the vast majority, social bonds predated 
ideological commitment, and that these bonds inspired alienated young Muslim 
to join the jihad. Affiliation is shown to be a bottom-up process, with young 
people volunteering to join the organization, and friendship and kinship bonds 
emerge as key factors in shaping the networks. Sageman dismantles the view 
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that terrorist networks resemble mafia families and that the tactics used against 
organized crime will somehow work against terror. 
   There remains a feeling that the debate on hybrids belies an attempt to group 
under the same rubric all conducts most human beings would find repellent, 
hence the widespread attempts to carry out joint analyses of such conducts. In 
this respect Europol (2015), responding to hyperbolic depictions of the hybrid 
phenomenon, stresses that, at least in the EU, the nexus between organized 
crime and terrorism remains limited:  
 
‘In light of the available evidence, convergence between organized crime 
and terrorism in the EU seems a limited phenomenon. Terrorist and 
organized crime groups have learned to adapt to changing circumstances 
such as governmental interventions or changed environments. This 
makes their structure, activities and methods opportunistic in nature […] 
Based on the cases available in the Europol databases, it can be concluded 
that convergence often consists of isolated incidents’ (ibid: 9). 
 
   Whether hybrids are rare or frequent, it is the heuristic value of joint analyses 
of organized crime and terrorism that could be questioned. Terrorism, like other 
forms of political violence, combines defensive and offensive strategies, a 
combination without which action could hardly be triggered. Such strategies may 
include ways of overcoming a presumed moral disorientation, but must provide, 
at the same time, strong, unequivocal guidance for individuals and groups to act. 
This combination of strategies coalesce in the form of collective identity, which 
transcends pure role or group identity, in that it refers to shared self-definitions 
and common efforts towards the production of social change. Collective identity 
offers orientation in a moral space and gives rise to a sense of self-esteem and 
self-efficacy; it also prompts what is worth doing and what is not in 
organizational terms, leading individuals to appreciate their capacity to change 
the surrounding environment. The cause pursued may not be ‘higher’, but it is 
certainly ‘different’.  
   Political violence, therefore, is one of the outcomes of organized identity, and 
entails high degrees of subjectivity, so that some features of social life are no 
longer seen as part of misfortune, but of injustice. Along with techniques of 
neutralization, political violence needs to elaborate an interpretive ‘frame 
alignment’ with the activists it intends to mobilize. The potential recruits possess 
a coherent body of knowledge about past experiences that can be utilized for the 
interpretation of the present. This constitutes a schema or ‘frame’ with which 
terrorist groups must align in order to attract sympathizers and adherents 
(Snow et al, 1986; Ruggiero, 2010). Moreover, violent political groups draw on 
their specific repertoires of action accumulated through long periods of conflict. 
Such repertoires consist of a legacy, made of cultural and political resources: 
they contain sets of action and identity derived from shared understandings and 
meanings, they are cultural creations that take shape in social and political 
conflict. 
   Every expression of political violence seeks to represent a contentious political 
issue, and to speak not only to the authorities but to social movements from 
which it claims to emanate. It is this purported (and at times real) link with 
social discontent and 'anger' that makes terrorism a distinct violent 
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manifestation. It is also its righteousness, be that religious or secular, that makes 
it different from other expressions of criminality. Terrorists fight for what they 
think will be a future system, their justification is 'transcendental' and 
'historical', in the sense that only history, in their view, will judge on the morality 
of their action. Terrorist violence is, in the view of those using it, a foundational 
force, that is expected to create a new system and designate a new authority. It is 
norm-oriented, in that it is meant to create new norms in the name of 
generalized beliefs. 
   This has significant implications for prevention and institutional responses. 
Successful organised crime groups are normally emboldened by alliances with 
complicit or complacent establishment actors, while violent political groups 
normally rely on the supposed ideological advocacy of anti-establishment 
groups. When such groups distance themselves from those who, through the 
exercise of terror, claim to represent them, the perpetrators of terror start losing 
their imagined justification and find themselves fighting a private war, one that 
only exists in their head. Terrorist groups of the past have declined when social 
movements have radically severed the symbolic and material links on which 
such groups believed they could rely. Anti-establishment non-violent forces 
expressing contentious political views were (and still are) more effective in 
fighting terrorism than action emanating from the establishment. By contrast, 
the weakening of organised crime may occur when efforts are made to sever the 
links between crime groups and the actors of the establishment who are 
associated with them, whether due to subjective choice or by virtue of objective 
shared interests. Organised crime, in other words, may decline when the elite 
(politicians and business people) will distance themselves from it. In brief, 
prevention of terrorism has a possibility of success when it originates from 
relatively ‘lower’ strata of society, while prevention of organised crime may 
temper the phenomenon when the higher strata of the institutions are targeted. 
The difference is notable, and joint analyses of the two may hamper and meddle 




We have to ‘collar’ the crime, not the criminal, suggested a crucial analytical 
strategy referred to white collar crime, meaning that some offences may be 
committed by individuals of high rank and reputation, conventional criminals 
bereft of any reputation at all, and consortia formed by both. In this paper the 
suggestion has been made that, when dealing with terrorism and crime, we have 
to ‘collar’ the criminal instead.  We have seen how criminological thought, while 
defining organized crime and political violence as two separate entities, offers 
some examples of hybrids incorporating the two. It does so, particularly, through 
etiologies that attribute to both types of criminality similar causations. The 
crime-terror nexus has emerged at times as strong and undeniable and at other 
times as tentative and ambiguous, depending on the work examined. The 
ambiguity of such nexus has been ascribed to the nature of political violence, its 
relationship with contentious politics, and its views of the law and the state. Lack 
of consensus still persists in this area, with the unfortunate consequence that 
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